Abstract: Nowadays, we witness a flood of continuously changing information from a variety of web sources. New challenges to track information changes in real time require new methods in web information retrieval using multi agent system (MAS) technology. This research continues previous work on extracting data from online social networks (OSNs) by using an agent in each user profile to monitor its updates, which are sent to a controller agent that saves a history of each user's activity in a local repository, as well as applying a vulnerability measure to users' profiles. An algorithm making use of MAS within the online social network retrieval system (OSNRS) is proposed. Our experiments on data extraction show that using MAS simplifies the process of tracking profile's history and opens the opportunity of understanding the dynamic behaviour of OSN users especially when it is combined with text mining. The application of the vulnerability measure over time highlighted that in the case of this experiment the structure of the node's network, rather than the contents of the node, changed over time. The validation of the vulnerability measure showed that friends of a profile, that disclose their personal details online, may not leak personal details about the profile.
Introduction
Retrieving information from different web resources such as websites, online databases and services is a major area that information extraction research has recently concentrated on. However, to get valuable information that satisfies the user or application requirements, more efforts are needed to overcome the difficulties that are related to information representation or extraction methods. The fact that this data is represented in different formats such as text, video and audio, in addition to the rapid changes in standard structures achieved in templates of resources such as social network web pages as well as changes to their contents, adds extra challenges to this research.
Online social networks (OSNs) can be described as an online domain where connections between users can be made via the creation of profiles in order to establish a network (Lenhart and Madden, 2007) . OSNs have been used widely by users of various ages. The increased simplicity in accessing the WWW via wireless devices such as laptops and smart phones helps end users to participate in OSNs. This gives them opportunity to make new friends, share their interests even with unknown people, upload photos and distribute their personal information. The distribution of personal information on OSN profiles raises privacy issues and can lead to users being vulnerable to social engineering attacks (e.g., phishing, identity theft, cyberbullying).
The dynamic changes to the users' profiles affect their networks' behaviours and actions which leads to alterations in the pattern analysis of the behavior of the users. Thus, more attention is required on how information will be collected from OSN websites, taking into consideration these rapid changes (Alim et al., 2009; Ye et al., 2010) .
Facebook (http://www.facebook.com), Twitter (http://www.twitter.com) and MySpace (http://www.myspace.com), and are leading OSNs in market size containing vast amount of information produced on a daily basis (Marketing Charts, 2010) . For example, the time spent by UK web users on OSNs is about 23% of the total time spent on the web, compared with 9% in 2007 (Acquisti and Gross, 2006) . Although there are numerous studies that attempted to extract millions of profiles from different OSNs (Caverlee and Webb, 2008; Mislove et al., 2007) , to date, they have analysed results from visiting each profile only once. To the best of our knowledge, there is no reported work to date that deals with the monitoring of the rapid changes in those profiles in terms of content.
This paper firstly provides a method to investigate situations which require a continuous observation of the user's profile in order to track the changes that could help in understanding the structure of OSNs and its effects on different disciplines. For example, security personnel, i.e., police and criminal investigators, are interested to monitor suspicious profiles or websites. Parents, guardians and social workers may also need to be aware of their children's online presence for safety reasons.
The extension to this work involves investigating the vulnerability of profiles as explained in Abdulrahman et al. (2010) and Alim et al. (2011) and the neighbourhood of profiles, and their change over time through applying a quantitative approach, to measure the users' vulnerability. The paper provides an insight into the vulnerability measure and whether a user's personal details can spread through an OSN network, because of the actions of the user's profile friends. This is an additional feature to just tracking the users' profiles.
For data extraction, our research presented in this paper extends the work presented in Abdulrahman et al. (2011b) , where the previous algorithm presented in Alim et al. (2009) was used to extract data from MySpace profiles. The algorithm was improved by using multi agent system (MAS) to build online social network retrieval system (OSNRS); this was proposed in order to overcome some of the limitations in preserving and recording the temporal ordering of OSN profiles' events.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explores the background of concepts regarding the OSN, agent and vulnerability which contributes towards finding different approaches to extract information from OSN and presenting a vulnerability measure to quantify the likelihood of personal details spreading through the network. Section 3 describes the methodology for the retrieval system (OSNRS) and its algorithm as well as presenting the vulnerability measure for OSN profiles. Section 4 details our experimental work on running some agents on MySpace profiles and applying the vulnerability measures to 18 profiles. Three profiles out of the 18 profiles are selected for case studies and explored in further detail. The validation of the vulnerability measure against the 18 cases is also detailed in Section 4 as well as validation of the measure against a larger dataset of cases which are from the Caverlee and Webb (2008) dataset. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and presents future work.
Background and related work
Data extraction for OSNs has been done for many years using a variety of approaches. The following subsections will overview some of the approaches, as well as will provide a brief description of agents and MAS which are used as a technique to extract data from OSN. The extracted data from a profile and its friends can be used in the application of a vulnerability measure. The concept of vulnerability is also explored.
OSNs information extraction approaches
OSN sites have been analysed by researchers using various extraction techniques. Most of the early research relied on non automated approaches to extract information through conducting surveys then analysing the results. For example, Gibson et al. (2007) had interviewed security experts and conducted surveys of students to emphasise that they unknowingly played an important role in posing themselves and their campus networks to malicious attacks. Acquisti and Gross (2006) , Dwyer et al. (2007) and Strater and Richter (2007) also used interviews and surveys to collect their information.
Since extracting information manually is time consuming and could not match the huge number of networks' profiles, automated information extraction is considered to be the saviour. Viswanath et al. (2009) studied the evolution of the activity of more than 60,000 Facebook social network users over 2 years. They used crawlers to get the interactions between all friends of a given user profile and friends of their friends in a Breadth First Search approach. From over 800,000 logged interactions between users, they found out that the majority of those interactions are generated by a minority of user pairs. Bonneau et al. (2009) retrieved information using crawlers, but for privacy issues. They introduced three different methods for information extraction. Public listing: to crawl public profiles, false profiles: to create a false profile to crawl "searchable" profiles, and profile compromise and phishing: which will target random or specific accounts using malicious applications and phishing attacks. They concluded that the existing privacy protection systems in OSNs are not consistent with users' expectations.
Agents and MASs
Most researchers consider that research on agents started in 1977 when Carl Hewitt introduced his actor model and termed it ëactorí (Bradshaw, 1997; Nwana, 1996) . Even though, there is no formal definition for an agent yet. However, Wooldridge (2002) defined an agent as "a computer system that is situated in some environment and capable of autonomous action in this environment in order to meet its design objectives".
An agent could not be found isolated in the environment. Each agent is designed to accomplish a specific task because it has incomplete information or limited capabilities. By working together, they can perform the task that is considered difficult or impossible for an individual agent to solve more efficiently. A collection of agents that communicate and cooperate with each other to achieve a common goal is called a MAS.
Agents have many features that encourage main software development companies that use object technologies to increase their interest in using agents. Table 1 lists some of the most common features that agents share (Bordini et al. 2007; Luigi et al. 2007) . Table 1 Agent features
Feature Description
Autonomy The ability to operate as a standalone process to achieve the goals and perform actions such as task selection, prioritisation and decision-making with some kind of control without direct intervention of user.
Social ability
The ability to communicate with other agents (users, software agents, software processes) by some kind of communication language at knowledge level by exchanging their beliefs, goals and plans.
Perceptivity
The ability to detect changes in the environment and respond in a timely fashion in such a way that achieves an effective balance between goal-directed and reactive behaviour.
Proactivity
The ability to exhibit goal-directed behaviour by taking initiative, not just act as response to the environment.
Mobility
The ability to convey itself between different machines in the network.
Many applications have been developed using agents. MetaCrawler (http://www.metacrawler.com) is a WWW search engine which provides a single central interface. It compiles the results of a requested query from different major search engines on the web.
The process starts by submitting the query to multiple agents in parallel, then performing a complex pruning on the responses returned by the agent to trim irrelevant, outdated or unavailable documents. Shopping bots such those used by eBay and Amazon.com are examples of applications using agents too. The agent browses the network to retrieve information about the user's requested good(s), compares the prices and suggests other products similar to the requested one depending on the history of other users.
Information extraction from OSNs using agents
To the best of our knowledge, the research in retrieving information from OSNs using MAS technology is limited to the studies done by Chau et al. (2007) . He extends previous work by Cho and Garcia-Molina (2002) but to work on a dynamic assignment architecture where a central coordinator (MasterAgent) will control other crawler agents. They used Breadth First Fashion to crawl the eBay network and list the pending users who are seen but not crawled yet in a queue data structure.
Each crawler agent sends a request to the MasterAgent for the next user in the queue to be crawled. Then it uses multiple threads for crawling and returns the extracted information to the master agent. The MasterAgent ensures that crawlers are working in parallel and no redundant crawling occurs. The work presented in this paper is similar to Chau et al. (2007) . However, our agents are designed to stay in each profile to keep listening for updates as we will illustrate in the next sections.
The concept of vulnerability in OSNs
Displaying personal details on OSN profiles may seem a novel way to communicate, but having your personal details displayed publicly can make you more vulnerable to privacy attacks and social engineering attacks which can lead to tragic consequences.
By making personal details readily available to your friends and strangers, you are making yourself vulnerable to privacy attacks, losing control of your personal details and ultimately your identity. Systems sometimes require personal details to authenticate or reset the system. An example is resetting the Yahoo e-mail password. You have to answer security questions giving for example your date of birth. If you have included your date of birth on OSNs, then an experienced professional or a hacker may use such information to reset your e-mail password and look through the contents of the e-mail account. This concept happened in reality and involved Sarah Palin whose Yahoo e-mail account password was reset by David Kernell, who then pasted contents of the e-mail account on webpages (BBC News, 2008) .
One field which can help to investigate privacy is social network analysis. In terms of OSN analysis, most of the work on social network metrics was undertaken in a pre Web 2.0 era by authors including Freeman (1979) and Wasserman and Faust (1994) . Since privacy issues have become more prevalent to end users especially so there is room for measures to consider privacy. One method of OSN analysis is modeling the OSN using a graph. The profiles are represented by nodes and the edges are the friendship links between the profiles.
Some concepts for vulnerability, based on graph theory concepts include cutpoint (Hannerman and Riddle 2005) , vulnerable bridge (Hannerman and Riddle 2005) and the use of outer nodes which are only connected to the main node. These concepts focus on the structure of graph but fail to take the node contents into consideration. Our initial definition for a vulnerable node in an OSN is stated below:
Definition: A vulnerable node is a node that contains attributes and neighbourhood features that breach privacy and provide grounds for a social engineering attack and the opportunity for the attribute values to spread through the network. For such a node a highly connected neighbourhood in which the neighbours display the attributes readily may increase the risk of vulnerability.
A highly connected neighbourhood refers to the clustering coefficient which is detailed in Section 3.4.1.1. With this definition taken into consideration, a vulnerability measure was proposed and this measure is explained in Section 3.4. From the vulnerability measure, a vulnerability theory was proposed which is detailed in Section 3.4.2.
Methodology
We present in this section an overview of contributions to OSNRS. The contributions involve designing and implementing a MAS to monitor OSN profiles over time through presenting the organisational model and the extraction algorithm of the proposed system. Also, a vulnerability measure is detailed to utilise the extracted data by OSNRS.
Online social network retrieval system
Our proposed OSNRS is a MAS that consists of a finite set of agents (grabber agents) controlled by a special agent called MasterAgent. Through this paper, the grabber agent (described by gAg) is used to refer to the agent that is responsible for retrieving information from OSN profiles. In contrast, the MasterAgent (which is described by mAg) organises the retrieving process and saving information in the local repository. More details will be provided in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
OSNRS aims to retrieve information from a given OSN profile (seed URL) in a multi-threading approach. Each gAg will be allocated to a unique URL address and will remain there in order to keep listening to any updates in the profile.
The retrieved information will be sent back to the mAg using different port. To speed up the extraction process, the port is set up just for transferring files to distinguish it from the port that is used by agents for communication with the mAg. The mAg will then create a history of each profile, which is recorded in a local repository to be analysed and mined later.
What is novel in OSNRS is that, the gAg will stay in the assigned profile and keep listening to any updates or changes in that profile. The updates are detected by comparing the current retrieved information with the saved file of the previous extraction process. Once a change is captured, the gAg will inform the mAg and send a copy of the new changes.
MAS has several features that fit well with our OSNRS. The autonomy of gAg allows it to operate as a standalone process to achieve its goal in retrieving information without direct intervention of users. The perceptivity of gAg permits it to detect the changes in the profiles and to make decisions when it has to report the results to mAg. The mobility feature permits the gAg to convey between different machines in the network. The parallelism of gAg helps to speed up the operation of extraction. The scalability of MAS will facilitate the process of adding new gAg or other agents for different proposes as required without having to change the existing system. The sociability allows gAg, mAg and users of OSNRS to communicate with each other and exchange their knowledge.
Organisational model of OSNRS
Java Agent Development framework (JADE) is one of the most significant open source software products for implementing MAS in recent years. Several researchers have used JADE for implementation such as Camacho et al. (2003) and Aldea et al. (2004) and because of this JADE has been selected to implement OSNRS. In JADE, each agent should live in a running instance of runtime environment that is called a container. A composite of containers comprises the platform. Although many agents could live in one container, and several containers could compose several platforms, we decided to simplify the OSNRS environment by:
• assigning one platform to compose all containers.
• creating each agent in a unique container. Figure 1 shows the structure of OSNRS and its environment. Note that the number of containers in a workstation could be different. Also, the local repository (database) could be accessed just by the mAg. 
Algorithm for retrieving data in OSNRS
Recent developments in the field of MAS have led to increase researchers' interest in adopting it to be used in various domains which include OSN.
As explained in the introduction, the objective of the proposed algorithm is to overcome the limitations in our previous approach (Alim et al., 2009; AbdulRahman et al., 2010) by applying MAS technology. The improved algorithm intends to speed up the extraction process, distribute agents in a multi-threading approach using breadth first search algorithm, skip non-extractable URLs without crashing the system, and listen to updates. Figure 2 ) outlines the approach for retrieving profile's personal information and a list of top friends from the MySpace social network. MySpace has been chosen to be the domain of OSNRS on the basis of its allowance for non registered users to access public profiles easily.
Our algorithm for OSNRS (illustrated in

Figure 2
The algorithm of data retrieval in the proposed OSNRS As mentioned before, one of our main drivers of our contribution is to keep an agent in each visited profile to track the updates and send a message to the mAg containing the new changes. Through this process, historical information of every profile will be saved in a local repository for future analysis and mining. The repository data is used to calculate the vulnerability of profiles as detailed in Section 3.4.
Vulnerability measure
There are three elements which constitute the vulnerability measure explained in Abdulrahman et al. (2010) and Alim et al. (2011) : individual vulnerability, relative vulnerability and absolute vulnerability. These concepts are explained in the following sub sections
From the local repository, OSN graphs (G) were produced for each day where each profile represents a node (V) in a graph and the friendship link between the profiles represents the edges (E) of the graph. To model the time factor into the OSN graphs, for a particular day, the profile's sub-network would be represented as a sub graph which consists of a directed multigraph G′ = (V, E). The OSN graphs were used to help calculate the clustering coefficient of a node, i.e., how well the neighbours of the node are connected, which is taken into account when calculating the individual vulnerability of a node as will be explained in Section 3.4.1.
Individual vulnerability
The individual vulnerability (V I ) of a node is calculated by analysing the node for the presence of attributes and neighbourhood features, i.e., the total number of friends and the clustering coefficient. An increased V I value for a node means that there may be an increased chance of disclosure of the node details by the node's neighbours, due to the details being public in the first place. A public profile is a profile where the profile owner discloses a lot of information about themselves.
Attribute selection
The attributes can be personal details or social network attributes, e.g., news feeds, e-mail addresses and likes. For this research study, to select attributes that contribute towards the vulnerability of a node, an online questionnaire was sent to staff and students from various universities in five countries: UK, Saudi Arabia, USA, UAE and Malaysia. The questionnaire required the subject to classify a list of 21 items of personal details in terms of importance when it came to disclosing someone's identity. The categories for importance were: not important, less important and more important. 51.2% out of 275 people who responded to the questionnaire were male, 48.3% were female and 0.36% chose not to specify their gender. The age ranges of the respondents varied and this reflected the vast age range of OSN users. 3.2% of the subjects were under 18, 41.4% were 18-24 years old, 44.7% were 25-34 years old, 5.8% were 35-44 and 4.72% were 45 or over. Figure 3 illustrates how the attributes were classed in terms of importance when it comes to disclosing a persons' identity. There were a small percentage of respondents who filled out the first part of the questionnaire (their gender and age) but then did not classify the attributes. That is why the percentages may not add up to 100. From the results in Figure 3 , the attributes were placed into the class with the highest percentage of respondents, e.g., occupation would be classed as less important. The attributes that were classed as the more important when it comes to identifying somebody included full name, gender, profile picture, date of birth, e-mail address, current address and contact number. Some of the attributes which were classed as less important, e.g., places and levels of education may actually be very important if the attributes are being used to identify children or teenagers.
The attributes we selected for this research study as contributing towards the vulnerability of a node included: full name, gender, age, profile picture, current address, total number of friends and clustering coefficient.
The first five attributes were selected because either some of the attributes (full name, gender and profile picture) were highlighted by the questionnaire results, as being as more important when it comes to identifying a person. Also some of the other attributes (age and current location) can contribute towards "Personally identifiable information" which can be used to "distinguish or trace an individual's identity" (Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2009; McCallister et al., 2009 . The first five attributes were also highlighted in research studies into privacy, e.g., Patchin and Hinduja (2010) and Gross and Acquisti (2005) .
The two neighbourhood features: (the number of friends and clustering coefficient) of the node were turned into attributes. Relative to the total number of friends, the current work considers the hypothesis of using an attribute to signal the impact of a manageable relative number of friends. For example, if a node had 150 or more friends, then a weight would be allocated to the node. The threshold value of 150 is known as Dunbar's (1992) number and Dunbar's theory is that 150 is the maximum number of humans a person can have a stable relationship with. The number of friends is an important factor because the friends that you communicate with may act as a catalyst to your personal details being spread therefore increasing your risk of being vulnerable to privacy attacks. This issue regarding the average number of friends is subjective and this is acknowledged by the authors.
Another neighbourhood feature is the clustering coefficient of a node (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) . It is a value between 0 and 1 and can be calculated using equation (1). The connection of a node and its neighbours are represented by the edges. The node represents a user's profile so the neighbours are the friends of the user.
( )
where E i is the set of edges between the neighbours of node i and N i is the number of neighbours of node i. The clustering coefficient shows the potential for the information to spread around the neighbourhood. If the node had a clustering coefficient of 0.5 or over, then it was allocated a weight because this shows the node potentially contained a well connected neighbourhood of friends.
Individual vulnerability
Equation (2) illustrates how to calculate the individual vulnerability of a node using the degree of self disclosure metric introduced by Lam et al. (2008) .
V denotes the individual vulnerability of node i, i = 1, .., q and q is the number of nodes in the network:
where m is the number of attributes, F j is a binary value to show whether an attribute j has been displayed in the profile (if attribute j is present then F j = 1, otherwise F j = 0) and W j is the weight that has been allocated to the attribute if it is identified as possibly contributing towards vulnerability. If the attribute has not been identified as contributing towards vulnerability then W j is equal to 0. A node having a high V I value indicates that the node presents its vulnerability attributes readily and shows indications that its neighbourhood is quite active therefore increasing the potential to spread personal details.
Weight allocation
In order to calculate the attribute weights, a statistical approach can be established from the questionnaire results by stating that the weight of an attribute which is classed as more important is double the weight of an attribute which is classed as less important. Each of the attributes selected for this research study was allocated a weight. Any
where q is the number of nodes in a network. To derive the attribute weights, a statistical approach was developed and illustrated in equation (3). An OSN profile p j ∈ P is defined by a tuple of attributes A = <a 1 , a 2 , …, a i , …, a m > where P is the set of profiles and m is the number of attributes. The sum of the attribute weights have to be equal to 1 therefore 2 ,
where A i is the set of attributes that contribute towards vulnerability of node i, S j is the total weight of the attributes that contribute towards vulnerability, k j S is the weight of each attribute that contribute towards vulnerability which are classed as less important A′ is the set of attributes that are classed as less important and A′′ is the set of attributes that are classed as more important. This approach produces weights which are based on the questionnaire. These weights are subjective, i.e., if another group are asked to classify the importance of the attributes then they may come up with different answers which would result in different attribute weights. The notation k j S is equivalent to the notation W j in equation (2).
Relative vulnerability
The relative vulnerability V R of a node is defined as the arithmetical mean of the individual vulnerabilities of a node's neighbours; any
where q is the number of nodes in the network. Equation (4) shows how to calculate the relative vulnerability of a node:
V is the individual vulnerability of the neighbour j and n is the number of its neighbours. The value of the relative vulnerability of a node can tell you about the behaviour of the node's environment. A high V R indicates that the neighbours are willing to display their personal details publically and increasing their chances of being vulnerable to social engineering or privacy attacks.
The relative vulnerability helps to formulate our approach on vulnerability estimation. Our view on vulnerability theory states that a seed node with a high relative vulnerability has an increased chance of the seed node's personal details spreading through the network, because of the public availability of the interactions that may leak personal details about the node, by the neighbours. Section 4.2.2 details the validation of the vulnerability theory.
Absolute vulnerability
The absolute vulnerability (V A ) is defined as a mathematical relationship between the individual vulnerability (V I ) and the relative vulnerability (V R ) and is illustrated in equation (5):
where i = 1,.., q and q is the number of nodes in the network. The operator • represented in this case the product operator. If the absolute vulnerability of a node is 1 then this value indicates that the node is most likely to lose control of its personal details through the spreading of the personal information through the network, by its neighbours and itself. This will increase its chances of social engineering attack. In its current state the vulnerability measure does not take into consideration the level of interaction between a node and its neighbours and that, e.g., friends of a friend can contribute towards to a node's vulnerability. This section has introduced the components and algorithm of the MAS which will be used to retrieve the data from the OSN profiles, which will provide real life case studies.
Also presented, is the details of the vulnerability measure which will be used to measure the vulnerability of the extracted profiles.
Experimental work and findings
The aim of the experimental work is to use the MAS to extract information from MySpace profiles, as well as monitoring the changes and updates in these profiles in order to apply and investigate the effects of profile contents and structure on the vulnerability of a profile. Thus, the experimental work is divided in to two sections as the following. The first part concerns the extraction process and the second part measures the vulnerability of the profiles.
Extraction processing
This section clarifies what settings that we have to prepare for extraction followed by explanation of how we used the MAS to extract personal details and a list of friends from MySpace profiles, as well as monitoring the changes and updates in these profiles.
Extraction settings
In order to start extraction process, we had to apply the following settings:
1 Setting the environment of OSNRS: Two workstations were connected to share one JADE platform. The containers are distributed on the two workstations to form the runtime environment. Initially, the mAg is created and connected to the database. PostgreSQL (http://www.postgresql.org/) is chosen to save the retrieved information.
2 Choosing the sample of OSNRS: MySpace OSN is selected to be the domain of our experiment. Two groups of sample have been chosen as follow: for Group 1, 20 random public profiles are set to be the seed URLs. There are no connections between these profiles, i.e., each profile is not in the list of top friends of other profiles. Group 2 was formed by choosing the profile that has the largest number of top friends, in our case 35 top friends. Subsequently, each profile in this list was established as a seed URL for extraction. As a result, we ensured that there are connections between these profiles.
3 Running the OSNRS: To run the system, we send each seed URL from both groups to the mAg. The mAg allocates a gAg to the seed URL to retrieve the list of top friends and number of all friends in addition to the personal information such as names (first name, last name and nick name), gender, age, country and link to photo. The gAg sends back this information to the mAg. Then, the mAg takes the list of top friends and allocates a unique gAg to each URL. The process is repeated as described in the methodology. In this stage of research, we are concerned about the top friends of each profile rather than all friends, and will stop if the specified number of friends is accomplished or if the second iteration is met; i.e., the friends of the friends of the seed profile. The retrieved information are not subject to rapid changes, therefore we decided to re-activate (awake) the agent once a day for two weeks to detect new updates.
Extraction findings
Since the target of this research focuses on justifying the proposed algorithm rather than being concerned about the profile contents, our experiment's simple goal was to allow the agent to track the updates in the profile. The goal is set to see how often the users change their friends either in the total number of friends or in their top list of close friends. To evaluate the accuracy of the retrieved results, we tested some profiles manually, particularly in cases that reported unexpected results as shown in the rest of this section, e.g., the empty cells in profile number 3 in Tables 3 and 4 . The results show that all retrieved information is correct. However, future work to extend mAg functions to randomly check the contents of information retrieved at random times is ongoing. Although OSNRS is a work in progress, the initial results were promising. The number of public profiles of both groups ranged between 130 and 160 according to the change in the sub-network. Almost 80% of the visited profiles were aged below 30.
Just over half of them (56%) were female. Table 2 presents results obtained from the preliminary analysis of the retrieved information. It shows that the user profile has a significant difference between the minimum and maximum number of all friends. The mode of the number of top friends in both groups was similar while it was double regarding the number of all friends. We used NodeXL (http://nodexl.codeplex.com/) open source application to illustrate the friend networks of the profiles. By way of illustration, Figures 4 and 5 show changes in the sub-network of a user profile in Group 2 when its list of top friends changed. The nodes represent the profiles while arrows represent the relationships. From the two figures, we noticed that the node labelled 4 in Figure 4 was removed in the second week of observation as shown in Figure 5 . As a result, all friends of node 4 have been removed from the sub-network. In addition, node number 10 has reduced its list of top friends in Figure 5 . The result that is taken from a joint sample as Group 2 is more helpful in understanding the behavior of the users of OSN than the result of disjoint users as Group 1. Moreover, from Table 2 combined with Tables 3 and 4 , we can see that users are likely to change their friends list, but they are unlikely to change their closer friends in their top list. In each group, less than 3% change their list of top friends.
Tables 3 and 4 also show daily changes in the number of profiles. The empty cells at the end of the row means that either the profiles have been removed from the list of top friends of someone's profile, or the account has been closed by the owner himself (e.g., profiles 4, 7, 10 and 12). If the empty cells are in the beginning of the table as in profile 9, this shows that this profile has just been added to the list of top friends. The single most striking observation from the tables is profile no. 3 when it has been dropped from the list of top friends of someone's profiles. Two days later, it has appeared again in the list of top friends of another profile. The fact that the profile already exists in the database will undoubtedly help in understanding the impact of this profile on the sub-network.
Table 3
Sample of tracking number of top friends for 14 days Also, we can conclude that the profile's large number of friends in the top friends list does not imply that all the profiles are retrieved. This depends on how many of those profiles are public. Moreover, missing information due to privacy issues will need to be factored into studies that analyse information from OSNs.
No. of top friends Profiles Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 8 Day 9 Day 10
Vulnerability analysis
The vulnerability measure was applied to profiles using the extracted data from the repository. Three profiles with varying neighbourhood environments were selected as case studies and are detailed and explored in more detail in this section. The validation of the vulnerability measure against the case studies is explained in Section 4.2.3.
Vulnerability case studies
For the application of the vulnerability measure, the process of extraction involved selecting profiles which are connected to each other based on being in a top friend list of a profile. These connected profiles became seed nodes which were monitored by the MAS everyday for three weeks between the dates of 24 October 2010 to 15 November 2010. The aim of this part of the experimental work is to calculate the vulnerability of three nodes at different times, i.e., time t 1 and time t 2 to examine if there are any changes in the vulnerability value or the profile contents of the node. These three nodes which represent three MySpace profiles were selected because they have varying neighbourhood environments. The attribute weight values for the individual vulnerability calculation were derived using the statistical approach in Section 3.4.1.3.
The attributes full name, gender, profile photo, clustering coefficient and total number of friends are classed as more important where as age and location are classed as less important. Even though the total number of friends and clustering coefficient did not appear as attributes in the questionnaire, the total number of friends and the clustering coefficient contributes towards the spreading of the personal information through the OSN. The more neighbours a node has, the more chances that one of the node's neighbours will spread the node's details and this increases vulnerability. Also if a node has neighbours which are well connected together then this can spread personal details around the neighbourhood and beyond. Applying the approach detailed in Section 3.4.1.3 to derive the weights.
Five attributes were classed as more important and two attributes were classed as less important which meant that the weight = 1/12 = 0.083 for less important attributes and 2/12 = 0.166 for more important attributes.
In terms of the attributes weights for this research study, if half the full name is displayed on the OSN profile, then half the weight was allocated towards the node.
The profile was observed in between time t 1 and time t 2 for attribute value changes. In regards to the extraction, only public profiles were extracted and private profiles were ignored. The case studies regarding the nodes and details about their neighbourhood are listed in Table 5 . Table 5 Case study details
Number of neighbours
Number of public neighbours
Clustering coefficient The notation t 1 represents the first time of analysis and t 2 represents the second time of analysis. In order to get the clustering coefficient values for the nodes at various time stages, OSN graphs were generated for each day and NodeXL was used to extract the clustering coefficient values for the nodes at certain times.
Vulnerability results and findings
The results in Table 5 highlight that the vulnerability values do not change. In some of the case studies (e.g., Cases 11, 12 and 15 in Table 5 ) the number of top friends increases but the relative vulnerability of the seed profiles has stayed the same. This is because in this study, the vulnerability is calculated using public profiles only. The new top friend for Cases 11, 12 and 15 are all private profiles, so their presence has no impact on the relative vulnerability value. With Case number 10, even though the number of top friends does not change, the number of public neighbours decreases between t 1 and t 2 but this has no change on the relative vulnerability value of the seed node. This is due to the individual vulnerability value of the two neighbours being the same. In Table 5 , there are minimal changes in the clustering coefficient values. Three seed nodes with varying neighbourhoods, which form the case studies (Cases 1, 2 and 3) were selected from Table 5 and explored in more detail at t 1 and t 2 . The subgraphs of the three seed nodes used for case studies were generated and these are displayed in Figure 6 . These graphs illustrated the state of the node's network on a particular day. The red dot in the subgraph represents the seed node used for the case study and the graph covers the top friends of the node and the top friends of the top friends.
Case study 1: neighbourhood with medium number of neighbours
At t 1 , node 1 had 11 top friends in its top friends list and it appears in another node's top friends list. Collectively there were 12 neighbours in node 1's neighbourhood but only eight of those neighbours were public profiles as illustrated in Figure 6 (node number 1 at t 1 by the subgraph of node 1 at t 1 ). The neighbours were not connected together and this was indicated by the clustering coefficient value of 0. Therefore, personal details may not flow as easily and fast around the neighbourhood or surrounding networks. In terms of the vulnerability value for node 1 at t 1 , node 1 has disclosed their attributes readily and this is shown by its high V I value ( as shown in Table 4 ), which indicates that the node increases the chances of being open to social engineering and privacy attacks.
Also there is an increased chance that one of the neighbours of the seed node with a high V I value may disclose personal details about the node in interactions made with other nodes. Node 1 also has a total of 594 friends, which can increase the potential for the personal details to spread into the surrounding network. This is especially if there are interactions which leak the node's personal details and the interactions are public. Interactions can include writing profile comments or the tagging of photos. Both types of interaction have the potential to leak the personal details of the profile owner and this is where the risk to being vulnerable can rise. The amount of interaction on a profile can be an indicator about how popular a profile owner is within a neighbourhood of friends.
With the V R value for node 1, the top friend neighbourhood of eight public profiles consists of nodes with varying V I values. Six nodes that have the same V I value as node 1 whereas two nodes have lower V I values.
One of the two nodes has lower than 150 total friends and no clustering coefficient value whereas the other node has only disclosed half their name, has lower than 150 total friends and no clustering coefficient value. Despite this, the overall V R value for node 1 is heading towards high relative vulnerability. The arithmetical mean operator takes all the V I values of the neighbours into account and in this case there was one neighbour that had a slightly lower V I value, in comparison to the other neighbours.
At t 2 for node 1, the attribute values of full name, gender, age, location, profile photo, number of total friends and number of top friends did not change in the time between t 1 and t 2 which is 21 days. Also the structure of the node, i.e., clustering coefficient and number of top friends did not change either.
Case study 2: OSN neighbourhood with high number of neighbours
At t 1 , node 2's neighbourhood consisted of 35 neighbours where only 11 of the neighbours were public profiles. In regards to the V I value, node 2 is the same as node 1 at t 1 because both nodes display their vulnerable attributes and has a large total number of friends. Unlike node 1 at t 1 , node 2 has a clustering coefficient value of 0.003 which is illustrated in Figure 6 (node no 2 at t 1 ).This shows that there is a minimal amount of connection between the neighbours, but not enough to influence the flow of personal details. For node 2 at t 1 , the fact that only 11 out of the 35 neighbours have public profiles indicates that some of the neighbours are more wary about other nodes seeing some of their details and especially their friends list.
The V I value of neighbours of node 2 at t 1 varies with seven of the neighbours having a high V I value of 0.833. The lowest V I value for a neighbour was 0.583 because the neighbour chose to display only part of their name, has lower than 150 friends in total and none of the neighbours of this node were connected to each other, so the clustering coefficient was 0.
Due to the method of calculating the V R of a node as being the arithmetical average of the V I values of the node's neighbours, the V R values of case study nodes 1 and 2 at t 1 are similar. This is despite the nodes having a different number of neighbours with varying V I values.
At t 2 , the vulnerability values for the nodes are still the same as at t 1 but there are some changes in terms of the profile attribute values, e.g., change in age, decrease in the number of total friends and in one case, an increase in clustering coefficient value as presented in Figure 6 (node 2 at t 2 ). For node 2, the average number of total friends for the neighbours at t 1 was 605 where as in t 2 it was 604.8. Unlike node 1 at t 1 and t 2 , there was no neighbour that had a huge amount of total friends. In the days between t 1 and t 2 , the total number of friends for node 2 has decreased but the full name, gender, profile picture, age, location and number of top friends has stayed the same.
We are aware that different nodes have different relationship strengths with their neighbours and in its current state our measure does not take the relationship strength into account. This is where future work will feedback into the vulnerability measure because the relationship strength can be integrated into the V R calculation to give a more accurate picture about the neighbourhood as well as allowing us to model the interaction of the neighbourhood.
Case study 3: neighbourhood with low number of neighbours
At t 1 , node 3 consisted of seven neighbours in which four of the neighbours were public profiles. The V I for node 3 at t 1 compared to nodes 1 and 2 at t 1 was slightly lower. This was because only half the name was presented and there was only a small clustering coefficient value of 0.024 as illustrated in Figure 6 (node no 3 at t 1 ). The neighbours for node 3 at t 1 all readily disclose the vulnerable attributes and have higher than 150 total friends which indicates that the neighbours are contributing towards node 3 vulnerability to social engineering attacks, due to their readiness to self disclosure personal details. The V A of node 3 at t 1 is lower than nodes 1 or 2 at t 1 due to the lower V I value of node 3 even though the V R is the same as the V R of nodes 1 and 2 at t 1 .
At t 2 there has been no change to the vulnerability value. In the days between t 1 and t 2 , the total number of friends for node 3 has decreased by 1, but the full name, gender, profile picture, age, location and number of top friends has stayed the same.
Overall, what the results have shown is that the number of public profiles which self disclose readily is a factor in the measurement of vulnerability. This is illustrated by case study 1 and 2. Even though case study 2 has a high number of neighbours with public profiles, the results show that a higher percentage of neighbours in case study 1 disclose more of the attributes that contribute towards vulnerability. This is shown by the higher V R value. In terms of time, apart from a change in the neighbourhood structure of the node, the personal details of the node did not change and consequently the vulnerability value of the node did not change.
The next stage is to validate the vulnerability of the case studies against the vulnerability theory to investigate whether a seed node which contains a neighbourhood with a high V R , has its personal details spread by its neighbours.
Validation of cases
The aim of the validation of the vulnerability measure is to investigate whether a seed node with a high V R increases the likelihood of their personal details being leaked through the OSN network by the interactions made between the neighbours and the wider neighbourhood (top friend of top friend) of the seed node. In this experiment the interactions analysed were profile comments exchange on profile walls. Each MySpace profile contains a wall which hosts the comments posted from the profiles' friends. Validation of the vulnerability measure involved validating the cases present in Table 5 and also 36,514 MySpace profiles from Caverlee and Webb (2008) dataset.
Validation of previous cases
To validate the 18 cases detailed in Table 5 where each case represents a seed node, the profile comments written by the seed nodes' neighbours' and posted on the walls of the wider neighbourhood were analysed for the presence for some of the personal details of the seed node in December 2011. The personal details included birthday, name, age, current location, education and hometown. Also, if there were other types of personal details that were leaked, these were noted as well. Out of the 18 cases which are detailed in Table 5 , nine cases displayed instances of vulnerability taking place where some of the seed nodes' personal details were leaked by the neighbourhood of the seed node. The V R of the nine seed nodes, ranged in value from 0.603 to 0.832 with the average number of top friends of the seed nodes which have public profiles being 4.8 and the average V R being 0.744. This shows that neighbours of seed nodes do like to self disclose readily and have characteristics that can contribute towards vulnerability. Details about the instances of vulnerability for each of the cases are explained below.
For Case 2, the neighbours' leaked some personal details regarding the seed node, in comments written to the wider neighbourhood. The name was leaked in 7 comments, the current location in 1 comment, and the date of birth in 1 comment. 10 profiles in the wider neighbourhood were private profiles so the walls could not be viewed. In Case 3, there are two comments which leak the name. With case 4, 13 comments leaked the name, 1 comment leaked the current location and the birthday. Also, family information was also leaked in a comment. In Case 6, 6 comments leaked the name but in Case 10, the nationality of the profile owner was leaked as well as the name of the profile owner in 10 comments. For Case 11, the name was leaked in 2 comments whilst the current location of the profile owner was leaked in 1 comment. Family information about the profile owner was leaked in Case 12 and 2 comments leaked the profile owner name in Case 13.In Case 17, the name of the profile owner was revealed in 5 comments as well as the nick name of the profile owner.
What these results have shown is that the number of comments does not increase as the V R of the seed node increases. This is illustrated in Figure 7 where the V R value and the number of profile comments have been plotted for all 18 cases detailed in Table 5 . An example being that Case 3 which has the highest V R value but only has two comments which disclose personal details of the seed node. On the other hand, Case 4 which has the highest number of comments that disclose the seed node's personal details has a V R value of 0.724 in comparison to a V R value of 0.833 for Case 3. Two main factors which can have an effect on the validation include the operator used to calculate the relative vulnerability (V R ) of the seed node and the number of neighbours with public profiles. Case 4 has ten public neighbours with varying individual vulnerability values ranging from 0.499 to 0.832 with an average of 0.724. Case 3 has only four public neighbours and so this decreases the chances of finding instances of vulnerability in the wider neighbourhoods of the neighbours because some of the neighbours are private.
With private neighbours, you can't view the list of friends or the comments on the friends profile pages. In comparison to calculating the V R value of a seed node using MAX, using the arithmetical mean takes the individual vulnerability values of all the public neighbours are taken into account. With the MAX operator, the neighbour with the highest individual vulnerability would be selected regardless of what the individual vulnerability of the other neighbours was. Also because in this experiment, private profiles were ignored, some of the cases in Table 5 have only one public neighbour and so the number of public neighbours can impact on result obtained from finding the average V I value.
When carrying out the validation a general observation was that there were profiles in the wider neighbourhood which were private so the comments could not be viewed.
A lot of the profile owners of profiles in the wider neighbourhood had stopped using their profiles. Comments had not been written on the walls since last year or the year before. This indicated that the profile owner may have moved onto another OSN or had found another way to communicate. In terms of vulnerability, having your personal details on a friend of a friend wall means that your details are open up to the friend of a friend sub-networks to view and this will mean it can be viewed in other levels of the OSN depending on the privacy options.
Validation of cases from Caverlee and Webb dataset
In order to test the vulnerability measure on a larger dataset, 36,514 MySpace profiles from Caverlee and Webb (2008) dataset were selected to act as seed nodes. To calculate the individual vulnerability, the MySpace profiles were analysed for the presence of personal information: name, gender, profile picture, age, current location and zodiac as well as neighbourhood features, i.e., clustering coefficient and number of friends.
In comparison to the experiment detailed in Section 4 where the attribute weights were calculated using a questionnaire and a statistical approach, the attribute weights for this experiment are based on the relative frequency of the attributes in the dataset. The relative vulnerability was calculated using the arithmetical mean operator which is illustrated in equation (4) and the absolute vulnerability which was calculated using the product operator in equation (5).
The comments from the walls of the wider neighbourhood of the seed nodes were examined to see if any of the comments written by the seed node's neighbourhood or other users, leaked personal details of the seed node itself. Caverlee and Webb (2008) only extracted the first page of comments from each of the MySpace profiles.
For this experiment the vulnerability of private profiles were taken into consideration as well because private profiles still display some personal details in the profiles, even if the list of friends profile comments are not visible.
Out of the 36,514 MySpace profiles which acted as seed nodes, 9,800 had instances of vulnerability with an average V R value of the seed nodes of 0.935. This value showed that in this sample of data, neighbours do like to disclose their personal details readily and have features that contribute towards vulnerability. The V R values of the seed nodes in which vulnerability was present ranged from 0.124 to 1. In terms of the personal details disclosed:
• 50.7% of the seed nodes had their names leaked in comments present in the profile walls of the wider neighbourhood
• 11.5% of the seed nodes had their current location leaked in comments present in the profile walls of the wider neighbourhood
• 0.76% of the seed nodes had their education leaked in comments present in the profile walls of the wider neighbourhood
• 12.1% of the seed nodes had their hometown leaked in comments present in the profile walls of the wider neighbourhood.
What these results and the results from Section 4 highlight is that the concept of vulnerability with OSN profiles does exist. There is no linear relationship between the number of comments in profiles of the wider neighbourhood which contain personal details of the seed node and the V R of the seed nodes. Also vulnerability can occur in seed nodes with low V R values. A seed node with a high V R value does not necessarily mean that vulnerability will occur. This finding indicates that work has to be done on the vulnerability concept in terms of the strength of relationship between two friends and how to quantify it in such a way that it can be incorporated into the vulnerability measure.
The strength of relationship between two users can be defined as the amount of interaction that takes place between each other OSN profiles. Interaction can involve the writing of profile comments on each other's profiles or the tagging of photos as well as exchanging gifts online. Also e-mails can be sent to each other. The strength of relationship between a seed node and its neighbours will present a more in depth picture about the online behavior and its relation to the spreading of the personal details of the seed node.
One issue which affects the validation of a larger dataset is ethics. In the past two years there has been much debate about whether it is ethical to extract OSN profile data that is publically available. One example is with Facebook. With Facebook, data extraction from OSN profiles has bought about new challenges recently due to the tightening of privacy controls by Facebook. In the past it was acceptable to build a web crawler to extract a vast amount of data from a Facebook network. Now, in order to extract data, an application has to be built using an application programme interface (API).
An API as described by IBM (2005) is "a functional interface supplied by the operating system or a separately orderable licensed programme that allows an application programme written in a high-level language". In comparison to using a web crawler to extract data from Facebook profiles, with an API application, the profile owner has to grant permission to the application in order to extract from their profile and profiles of their immediate network of friends. The profile owner grants access to the application in order to know exactly what type of data they have authorised the application to access. For an application that wants to extract data, types of permissions that an application may require include:
• access to the basic information of the profile owner
• the ability to post statues, messages, photos and videos on the profile owner's behalf • access messages in the profile owner's inbox
• access posts in the news feed (known as a wall) of the profile owner
• access the profile owner's list of friends
• access information that people share with the profile owner.
Granting the list of permission mentioned above to the applications enables the extraction of useful and meaningful data but poses serious privacy concerns. One issue highlighted by the permissions is that the profile user is responsible for the privacy of their friends' profiles as well. This can cause some ethical debate because Facebook's stance on data extraction profiles is that you have to ask permission of the profile owner that you wish to extract from BBC News (2011).
Conclusions and future work
This paper investigates the retrieval of information from OSNs through MAS technology implementation of OSNRS. OSNRS is designed with multi-threaded agents in which each agent's thread is assigned to a specific profile to track information changes in the users' profiles. This study will serve as a base for future studies in the process of tracking user profile's history and understanding the behavior of OSN users especially when combined with text mining.
Our process to correctly and accurately monitor and retrieve profile information is not affected by the size of the retrieved information. Nevertheless, OSNRS will be further implemented for the extraction of information from a large sample and over a longer period of time than presented in this paper. That will help provide a better understanding of the behavior of the network.
OSN change their approach to access information from OSN profiles continuously. Therefore, the implementation of OSNRS should be modified to use API in order to be deal with changes. Also further work is required for evaluating mAg functions to check the contents of the retrieved information.
In terms of the vulnerability measure over time, we demonstrated was that the structure of the node's network, rather than the contents of the node, changes over time in the case studies presented. This resulted in the vulnerability values staying constant over the time period measured. A longer tracking time may produce different results and cause change in the values, presence or deletion of personal details.
The validation of case studies from the dataset generated by OSNRS and Caverlee and Webb (2008) dataset highlighted that vulnerability can apply to OSN profiles. Friends of a profile can spread some of the profile's personal details in comments written to other friends. However, a high V R does not necessarily mean that the number of comments that disclose the personal details of the profile will increase.
Future work will involve carrying out more research into relationship strength between a node and its neighbours and then incorporating this aspect into the vulnerability measure. Also, one issue which affects the validation of the vulnerability measure on a larger dataset is associated with ethics. With the move of data extraction of OSN profile data towards the use of API, data extraction now requires the permission of the profile owner in order to extract the personal details of them and their friends.
